Article Written By EIH Researcher And Writer
Anupam Tripathi
The Mughals were a dominant ruling force in the subcontinent from 1526 CE to 1857 CE, till they were replaced by colonial British rule. During these three hundred years, the structure and functioning of the army underwent many changes and adaptations. A new military style of combat was introduced with increased use of artillery and muskets. However, this does not mean that older weapons were completely replaced. In fact, they were supplemented with new ones, especially artillery. The new weapons contributed to the change in battlefield tactics in terms of the use of units in combat, the positions of infantry, cavalry and artillery.
Many historians claim that the Mughals brought artillery to India, however, that was not the case. Iqtidar Alam Khan in Gunpowder and Firearms brought various evidences to prove that the Indians had access to gun technology. There is no doubt that the Indian powers were aware of gunpowder, but the use of gunpowder was limited to heavy weapons. A primitive type of gunpowder artillery was being used in different parts of the India during the second half of the fifteenth century. By the middle of the century, there was known in North India a firearm called Kashakanjir, which threw balls by the extensive force of combustible substances (darruha-i atishin). A weapon resembling cannon was also reported in Kashmir. Srivara in Jaina Rajatarangini records that this weapon was called topa in Muslim language while in the Kashmiri dialect it was called kanda. In the case of the Vijayanagara Empire, too, the use of firearms is regarded as the most important success factor not only against the Bahmanis, but also against the internal enemies, such as the powerful chiefs of the Tamil region.
The decisive difference in the case of Mughals lies in the correct use of gunpowder. The Mughals introduced light, also known as Gajnals and medium cannons. The light weapons were carried by 4 to 5 people and the heavier ones, called tops, were lifted by elephants. Being light and easy to handle, the light cannons could be used in open battlefields and were easy to maneuverer. Indian cannons could only be used in static positions as they could not be moved and were heavier than the lighter Mughal artillery. In addition, Indian guns were made of bronze, so it took a long time for the guns to cool down before the second shot was fired. More than helping, these heavier weapons became quite a liability. The metals used by the Mughals not only had high heat resistance, but were cheaper as well. This is why these new guns were more effective on the battlefields.
Another development, as Khan pointed out, was the use of handguns known as Tufangas. They could be easily used to set target. These were run by the Tufangchis. From Portuguese sources we find that the Indians of the Deccan and Malabar regions knew about these handguns from the Portuguese. However, The North Indian powers (Shaikhzadas, Rajputs, Pathans, etc.) were unaware of the tufangs. The Mughals introduced the horse rider Tufangchis. This helped them claim extraordinary superiority. Akbar also introduced the Flint Gun technology (comes with using the trigger). The availability of gun technology made warfare more effective. Akbar used wrought iron technology in the manufacture of firearms. The construction consisted of forming a series of longitudinal bars into a tube by hammering them around a mould called a mandrel and welding them together. Alternatively, a single sheet of iron could be wrapped around the mandrel and then welded closed – this was particularly suitable for small pipes. The pipe was then reinforced with a series of rings or sleeves (actually hoops). These were forged with an inside diameter roughly equal to that outside of the tube. They were heated and slid over the cooled tube where they were held in place by thermal contraction. The sleeves or rings were spliced together and the gaps were sealed with a second layer of hoop forging a strong, airtight seal. Hoop-and-stave construction permitted the fabrication of guns far larger than had been made previously. It was not a question of whether or not the Mughals introduced gunpowder to India. Their success depended more on how they used the available resources.
The ranking of a Mughal mansabdar depended on zat (personal pay and status) and sawar (size of his cavalry). Every Mughal Subah or province had a cantonment where a mansabdar was stationed with his troops. He provided allowances to his troops and horses to those who did not have one. Military training was based on physical fitness. It was offensive in nature. Soldiers were taught to physically impair or destroy the enemy. Shamshir Zani and Teeerandazi were basic exercises for the soldiers. Some historians such as Jos Gommans have argued that the decisive factor in Mughal’s success was the availability of war animals. It was not just rifles, cannons, but also the availability of fine-bred horses and elephants. The most significant aspect of the Mughal army was its cavalry. From 16th to the end of 17th century, the Mughals played a very critical role in maintaining and continuing the regular import of horses for imperial services. The importance of horses encouraged emperors to establish control over the warhorse trade, land routes, and sea routes. Many safety and security measures were provided to commercial activities to encourage the continued supply of warhorses to the Mughal army. As the ecological conditions were not favorable for ideal breeding for horses in India, Mughals procured war horses with the help of horse traders via long distance caravans trade-routes and sea routes. Kabul and Qandhar were the most important reloading points on the land routes in India. Good horses were imported to the Mughal court from Arab, Iran, Turán, Turkey, Turkestan, Badakhshan, Shirwan, Qirghiz, Tibet, Kashmir, and other countries. The ports of Surat, Cambay, Kutch, Thatta, Lahori Bandar and Sonargoan were the most important entry points for the Arabian and Persian horses. The imported horses were more expensive and the imperial documents reveal that the Mughal had spent maximum of their revenue share on the purchase of quality horses. Mughals exported agrarian products, textiles, spices, herbs etc. in exchange of horses.
Pratyay Nath in ‘Climate of Conquest’ points that the military conflict was a constant preoccupation of the Mughal state throughout 16th and 17th centuries. He argues that the crucial factor was the issue of ecology and environment. Mughal empire interacted and negotiated with the environment and utilized its resources in process of supplying its military campaigns mobility, human and animal labor. It was the landscape, the mountains, the hills, the rivers, etc. that decided what available technology to use. The Mughal wars were based on local contingent issues. State had to manage the maintenance, repair and construction of fortifications, training, deployment of soldiers, their salaries, storage and shipping of weaponry, etc. War was not something alien to Mughal society. War shaped the very nature of the Mughal state. In different regions, different war animals were used and this decided the success of the Mughals. Means of communication, supply channels, were the first to decide the fate of the Mughal warfare. In addition to this, we also need to focus on the social environment of Mughals. The ability of the state to develop alliances with local elites decided the outcome of wars. Pratyay sees Mughal warfare through the lens of diversity and heterogeneity. He argues that the Mughal artillery varied across time and space. Number of factors contributed to this variation, like natural environment, nature of adversaries, etc.
When we talk about Mughal warfare, one of the first things we discuss is their warfare technology, animals, cavalry, artillery. But one thing that historians talk about very often is non-combatants. Most of Mughal wars were siege wars. In siege wars, it was unclear how many people were locked inside the fortifications. There was no idea of the amount of food, the military strategy of the other group. It was full of uncertainties. Akbar waged siege wars. Some of famous siege wars of the Mughals were Chittor (1567-68 CE) Ranthambore (1569 CE), Kalinjar (1569 CE). This was done to limit the mobility of the other group and completely exhaust their resources. For these wars there was a need for specialists for the construction of cannons, the supply of food, etc. About 5,000 people would move ahead of Akbar to set up camps in the fields. There were professional camp makers, 150-200 carpenters, hundreds of tankers, loggers, 200-300 soldiers to guard the camps. Each elephant required 10-15 people around. The horses required 3-4 people. These thousands of people were known as non combatants. They did not wage war but were an important part of the Mughal army. This shows that creating an army itself required props.
Warfare was not just about waging wars, using new and superior technologies. It was also about forging new alliances, creating livelihoods for thousands of people, and using ecology and the environment to the fullest for their own benefits. The Mughals saw war as an inevitable means of achieving equilibrium. They legitimized military violence and allowed a high degree of flexibility in the use of violence The empire did not eliminate the adversaries, but conquered and appropriated them.
Bibliography
- Pratyay Nath, Climate of Conquest.
- A. Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms.
- A. Khan, Gunpowder and Empire
- Jos Gommans, The Mughal Warfare.
- Jos Gommans, Warfare Technology in Mughal Indian.
- Jos Gommans and Dirk Kolf, Warfare and Weaponry in South Asia.
- Andrew De La Garza, The Mughal Empire at War.
- Douglas E. Streusand, The Formation of Mughal
